Missile Defense: Introduction
The idea of missile defense originated as part of the
strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. The United States have been engaged
in missile defense research and has designed several such systems
over the past 50 years, but has never managed to field one that
is effective. The missile defence issue effectively disappeared
until the early 1980s. This section outlines the main course since
the missile defense revival, starting with President Reagan's
controversial Strategic Defense Initiative.
|
|
Introduction: |
|
Strategic Defense Initative |
|
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan revived ballistic missile defense with
his multi-billion dollar Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly
referred to as "Star Wars" after the famous scienc- fiction movie. SDI
sought to exploit new technology to catch ballistic missiles in their
boost phase. The principle behind it was to make the threat posed by
nuclear long-range missiles "impotent and obsolete", an attempt to
find technological solutions to the strategic problem of nuclear
danger. The proposed system was to incorporate a variety of land-, air-,
sea- and space-based weapons to intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
Critics pointed out this system would violate the ABM Treaty, which
prohibits the deployment of space-based components. Political support
waned, as the idea of an impenetrable shield soon appeared hopelessly
impractical.
- Address
to the Nation by President Ronald Reagan on Defense and National
Security, March 23, 1983
- Strategic
Defense, Strategic Choices: Staff Report on the Strategic Defense
Initiative, Democratic Caucus of the US House of Representatives,
May 1988 (pdf)
- Possible
Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative, DCI
Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Secret NIC M 83-10017
(unclassified), September 12, 1983
- Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies,
Office of Technology Assessment, 1985 (pdf)
Concludes that the assured survival of the U.S.
population in case of a nuclear attack was not a realistic goal of the
SDI program. The system would be unable to defend against a diverse
means of delivering nuclear weapons and could be overwhelmed by simple
countermeasures. Consequences of deploying SDI might adversely affect
future arms control negotiations and security policy and encourage the
militarization of space and destabilize the nuclear balance of
power.
Brilliant Pebbles and GPALS |
|
The administration of US President George Bush Sr. scaled back but
essentially maintained the Reagan administration's committment to SDI:
continued research and eventual deployment of a system to protect the
United States against a ballistic missile attack. Its version of SDI would
place in earth orbit approximately 10,000 ICBM interceptors, called
Brilliant Pebbles, to intercept ballistic missiles in the first minutes of
flight, before they could release their multiple warheads and decoys.
Although less ambitious than Reagan's SDI, the Brilliant Pebbles program
would also still violate the ABM Treaty.
After the Gulf War, the Bush administration changed the mission of SDI
from emphasizing a defense against large-scale Soviet attack to protection
against limited ballistic missile strikes. The new component of SDI was
called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). It perpetuated
the old program’s multilayered architecture, combining a space-based
layer, a ground-based theater missile defense (TMD) and a ground-based
National Missile Defense (NMD). GPALS was the first anti-missile system
that had a North-South rather than East-West orientation.
Theater and Limited National Missile Defense |
|
In contrast to the Bush administration, the Clinton administration
refocused its efforts and budgets to land-based theater defense programs,
designed to protect deployed forces and allies in a theater of military
operations against missiles up to 3500km. The concept of a global shield
evolved into a modest research program called 3+3 NMD Deployment Readiness
Program.
Missile defense became an issue in the 1996 presidential
campaign. The Republican party advocated legislation that would require
the Clinton administration to develop a comprehensive system as soon as
possible. The point of contention in this debate was the timeline in which
so-called rogue states would acquire long-range ballistic missiles. In
response to the Rumsfeld Commission report and the August 1998 testing of
a long-range missile by North Korea, the Clinton administration announced
to accelerate the development of a limited NMD capability. In July 1999
President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act which mandates
automatic deployment of a missile defense system "as soon as
technologically feasible". Although not a multilayered system, the Clinton
administration's NMD scheme would have violated certain aspects of the ABM
Treaty, and a number of U.S.-Russian discussions were held on this issue.
In December 2000, after a series of testing failures, President Clinton
decided the technology was not mature enough in order to make a commitment
to deploy it.
- Report of the Commission
To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld
Commission), Executive Summary, July 15, 1998 (pdf)
- 1999
National Missile Defense Act, H.R. 4 as sent to the President (also
pdf)
- Remarks On
National Missile Defense, President Bill Clinton, September 1,
2000
- Review
of U.S. Foreign Policy at the End of the Clinton Administration,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 26, 2000 (also pdf)
During his presidential campaign, George W. Bush promised to pursue NMD
deployment as rapidly as possible and to explore a more robust system than
the land-based option under consideration during the Clinton
administration. Key Bush Administration officials have repeatedly
stated that missile defenses are necessary to protect America's ability to
project power by limiting the vulnerability of the American homeland and
troops abroad. The Bush administration also rejects the strategic
principle of mutually assured destruction as it is described in the 1972
ABM Treaty and others, arguing that 'deliberate vulnerability' is not an
option.
Click here to learn more about the Bush administration's
ABM diplomacy
General
- Shield
Embattled, Missile Defense as a Foreign Policy Problem, Peter
Rodman, The Nixon Center, October 2001 (pdf)
Analyzes the national and international debate on
ballistic missile defense. The report argues that the U.S. should
review the full range of technicological options to break the psychological
and political taboo against U.S. deployment. An understanding with
the Russians should be the U.S. preference, but it should proceed
unilaterally if the discussion fails. Washington should seek an intensive
dialogue with NATO allies and accelerate cooperation with Asian allies
on TMD. Also pursued should be a dialogue with China.
- Defending
America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense,
Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 2000 (full report, pdf only)
This comprehensive report examines the need for and the implications
of missile defense. It reaches the conclusion that missile defense
is not now critical but could become necessary in five or ten years.
It needs to be linked to a strong global counterproliferation strategy,
an integrated approach to homeland defense, and the commitment to
balance NMD against both arms control programs and US efforts to improve
its offensive and retaliatory options.
Also available are the Conclusions
on NMD, CBRN and Cyberwarfare and an Executive
Summary, pdf all
- Harnessing the Power of Technology, Department
of Defense, September 2000 (pdf only)
Comprehensive report which is useful as a basic primer although biased
towards the general idea of missile defenses.
- Pushing the Limits.
The Decision on National Missile Defense, Stephen Young, July
2000 (also in pdf)
Examines the debate over NMD during the Clinton administration
and concludes that the case for deployment of a limited system is
weak.
- National Missile
Defense: Rushing to Failure, Johne Pike, Journal of the Federation
of American Scientists, November/December 1999
Missile Defense History
Deterrence
- Moving
Away from MAD, Michael Krepon, Survival, Summer 2001
The deconstruction of MAD constitutes an ambitious and difficult
agenda. The dangers of proliferation are growing, and singleminded
approaches of missile defence enthusiasts and staunch treaty protectors
are not sustainable. A new approach is needed, and the essential choice
the Bush administration faces is cooperative threat reduction
or strategic superiority.
- Does
Deterrence Have a Future? Lawrence Freedman, Arms Control Today,
October 2000
In the post-Cold War world, deterrence still has a role
to play, although not the one it had during the Cold War. The problem
with NMD is that it fails to calm the behavior of states of concern,
but will likely aggravate other problems, in particular the already
tense American relations with Russia and China.
Public Oppinion towards NMD
- Missile
Defence Poll, July 12, 2001 (complete data available as MS-Word file)
According to an opinion poll conducted by MORI on
behalf of the UK Working Group on Missile Defence, 70% of British voters
agree that U.S. missile defence development will encourage other
countries to build more advanced nuclear weapons.
- Analysis
of Recent Polling Data on National Missile Defense, Council for a
Livable World/The Mellman Group, July 9, 2001 (pdf)
Missile defense is an issue to which few Americans are paying
close attention. Support for a missile defense shield turns to
opposition when voters are focused on the failure of the system to work
and the fact that developing such a system would violate the ABM
Treaty.
- 'Go
Slow': The People Speak on Missile Defense, John Isaacs, Arms
Control Today, January/February 2000
The
American public generally supports national missile defense but also
accepts most of the criticisms advanced by its opponents. In terms of
broader policy choices facing the United States, the public still
strongly supports arms control, even as an alternative to missile
defense.
|