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NATO Parliamentary Assembly
12 October 2000

              (...) 10. This is, of course, the case of Russia, which renders NATO's involvement in
                           any European conflict very delicate. Western countries are faced with a
                           dilemma. Pending the consolidation of a real European defence capacity, they
                           have no instrument but NATO at their disposal once they have determined that
                           they need to use force. On the other hand, for the sake of Europe's security as a
                           whole, Western governments have no choice but to consider Russia as a
                           security partner. The two requirements are not easily compatible. As shown
                           during the Kosovo crisis, despite strenuous Western efforts to involve Moscow
                           in the management of the conflict - through the Contact Group, the G8, the
                           Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission, the eventual return to the Security Council
                           with Resolution 1244, and Russia's subsequent participation in KFOR - in the
                           eyes of the Russians, NATO's unilateral military operation against the Federal
                           Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) basically meant that their opinion could be
                           discarded. Indeed, the crisis in Kosovo dealt a very hard blow to the already
                           deeply wounded pride of the former superpower. One of the big challenges of
                           the development of the CESDP will be to ensure that it does not trigger a
                           reassessment by Moscow of its relatively benevolent analysis of Europe's
                           current efforts. (...)