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BITS Policy Note 00.3
June 2000
ISSN 1434-3274 |
by Clara Portela-Sais and Denise Groves
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When European Union leaders meet on June 19 and 20 in
Portugal for the European Council summit, they will have a full agenda. The most pressing
issue facing the EU, however, is not on the formal program. US intentions to construct a
National Missile Defense (NMD), although not directly related to the EU, is an issue they
must deal with. The challenge will be whether the EU can form a Common Position expressing
widely shared concerns over the effects such a system would have on the future of arms
control, disarmament, and international security. Given the growing pressure on the EU to
make clear its opposition, as well as the EU’s desire to prove its credibility, it
should declare a Common Position on this subject.
US plans to build an NMD is causing concern among Europeans. They are
worried about the future of the ABM Treaty, which they consider the cornerstone of arms
control. They are also worried about Russia’s reaction to deployment of NMD. To date,
they have expressed their dissatisfaction, but have been careful to avoid seeming too
energetic in their opposition because they recognize that the issue is primarily one
between the US and Russia. Still, NMD will have consequences for European security because
of the effects it may have on Russia and on international security. Furthermore, Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s surprising proposal to develop a joint NATO-Russia defense
system pulled the Europeans directly into the debate. His proposal and recent travels
through Europe were well-timed: it is likely that the issue of NMD will creep into
conversations at the upcoming EU Summit. Putin may be trying to exploit European
objections over the plans for an NMD, perhaps in the hopes that they might form a Common
Position on the matter, a position he believes would be in his favor.
It is clear that the EU has real stakes in the question of NMD. First,
and most important, Europeans believe there is a reasonable risk that deployment of NMD
will spark a renewed nuclear arms race and destabilize international security. Russia has
already made it clear that it will only consider further reductions of its nuclear forces
if the ABM Treaty is preserved. If the US decides to abrogate the Treaty, Russia will then
respond by withdrawing from all other existing nuclear arms control agreements, such as
the START treaties. In addition, Russia has also threatened conventional arms control
agreements such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Attention should also be
drawn to the fact that NMD would render China's nuclear arsenal irrelevant, possibly
forcing that country to upgrade its nuclear program. This nuclear competition could spread
to India and Pakistan, and may persuade other non-nuclear countries in the region to
follow suit.
Second, given the close economic, political, and
geographic links with Russia, Europe has strong interests in preserving stability and
security there. Construction of the NMD system could undermine Russia's faith in its
strategic deterrent and subsequently compel Russia to divert resources from its economic
development programs towards its nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, as evidenced by the
Common Strategy on Russia, the Europeans have been talking for years about the need for
constructive engagement with Russia; ironically it seems Russia has taken the initiative
and is engaging Europe. Now seems to be a suitable occasion for the EU to improve its
relationship with Russia.
Third, an American NMD could actually increase the vulnerability of Europe. The
location of some of the radar facilities that would be used for NMD in England and in
Greenland, a Danish territory, directly involves the EU in the construction of the
American system. This means that acquiescence to US plans would make these countries
partly responsible for the operation of the system without actually benefiting from it.
Putin made the stakes more clear, warning that if those governments allow the early
warning radars located on their territory to be upgraded and linked into the NMD system,
they would be injecting themselves into a process that will destabilize international
security. In addition, members of the local parliament in Greenland have noted that the
radars there and in Britain could be attacked in an attempt to defeat the defense system.
Therefore, NMD presents a clear threat to the integrity of Europe and its security.
Is it likely that the EU will actually take this chance to develop a
Common Position?
The simple answer is no. First of all, the issue is not yet even on the
agenda. There is substantial opposition from Britain to even consider using the EU as a
forum in which to address it. Robin Cook, the British Foreign Minister, has said that it
would be unwise to seek a specific EU policy on NMD since "the EU should not be a
place for territorial collective defence." He argued that the matter is best left to
NATO. Other EU member states might defeat this argument by stressing that the EU should
instead approach the matter with arms control issues in mind. Mr. Cook’s assertion
opposes that view, owing to the fact that the British place priority on their
long-standing allegiance to the US. However, a transformation in strategic thinking is
taking place in the UK. That is, they are now in the process of reconsidering whether the
future of the European continent is more important to the future of Britain. Over time,
and with some pressure from other EU member states, the British reluctance to openly
oppose the US might be overcome.
The EU would probably still find itself unable to agree to a Common
Position because the intensity of opposition varies among member states. Like Britain,
some countries feel that that expressions of strident hostility would run contrary to the
more fundamental interest of maintaining the transatlantic link. This is exemplified by
statements issued by European leaders during President Clinton's recent visit through
Europe. For example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder balanced his criticism of the NMD
by conceding that the US government’s decision to deploy the defense system is a
sovereign one. However, Europeans should not underestimate the influence they can have on
the US. This is true especially considering that the United States relies on European
support and cooperation in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. This is clearly
the case with regard to NMD because the US will need the permission of two EU members in
order to use the radars in Greenland and England in the planned system.
The underdevelopment of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) is an additional obstacle. In particular, the competence to deal with security
matters has only been partly delegated to the EU and has not yet been tested. The
capabilities to form a truly effective Common Position are weak and it remains to be seen
whether the EU can be effective in this arena. The record is not encouraging and this NMD
challenge may prove to be too much too soon. However, by declaring their position, the EU
could overcome a reputation they have stated they are uncomfortable with.
The time seem ripe for the EU to articulate a Common Position on this
question. Individual members of the EU have already expressed dissatisfaction with the
plans for an American missile defense in various venues. For example, during President
Clinton's recent visit to Germany, Schröder expressed the wish that the President take
into consideration the concerns of the European allies before he makes a decision on
deployment. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also suggested that the Europeans should
adopt a joint position on this controversial subject, but recognized that "interests
are not homogeneous within Europe, so we will need time for discussion." Europeans
can find the common ground with regard to the ABM Treaty. For example, statements issued
at the UN conference to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in April and May
demonstrate French and British reservations. At the conference, the UK stated that the US
position on NMD and amendment of the ABM Treaty "should be addressed bilaterally with
the Russians...[W]e hope that they can reach an agreement. We have made clear to both
sides that we continue to value the ABM [Treaty], and wish to see it preserved." For
its part, France declared that it was "anxious to avoid any challenges to the treaty
liable to bring about a breakdown of strategic equilibrium and to restart the arms
race."
Putin's surprising proposal to develop a joint defense system also
served to place the onus on the Europeans to directly respond to missile defense
questions. In other words, rather than merely echoing the opinion of US officials who
assert that the proposed system will not be able to protect the whole of Europe, EU and
NATO member states should grasp the opportunity to directly respond to the offer and make
clear their own positions on the effect NMD can have on arms control and international
security. Besides, the integration of security and defense policies under the auspices of
the CFSP will call for members to harmonize their views on crucial issues. By taking a
decisive position, the EU can add credibility to its claims that it is striving for
greater autonomy and responsibility in its external relations
The EU has already officially stated its intentions to work with Russia
and to deal with matters related to arms control and disarmament as well as international
security. The Treaty on the European Union empowers the European Council to adopt Common
Positions that "safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and
integrity of the Union...to preserve peace and strengthen international security...[and]
promote international cooperation..." Common Positions "shall define the
approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature."
In addition, in June 1999, the EU agreed to a Common Strategy on Russia—its first
Common Strategy—which stated that the EU would seek to cooperate with Russia to
"identify common responses to the security challenges in Europe and beyond...by
promoting arms control and disarmament and the implementation of existing
agreements."
If the EU decides to fulfill this express mandate, there
are several options available to it. On one extreme, the EU could adopt a Common Position
that declares its unconditional opposition to the deployment of NMD on the basis of the
disruptive impact it would have on arms control and international security. Alternatively,
the EU could call for the preservation of the ABM Treaty and suggest that the US delay its
decision on deployment to allow enough time for negotiations with Russia to proceed. This
might include consideration of working cooperatively with Russia on missile defense
development and on non-proliferation initiatives. Or the EU could simply repeat the vague
language already used to express a desire to see international security preserved, for
arms control treaties to be respected, and for the concerns of the allies to be weighed in
preparation for the decision on deployment. This third choice is as good as not adopting a
Common Position at all.
On the other hand, the framing of a more strongly worded Common
Position such as the first or the second option can show that the EU is capable of acting
effectively and in unison on security issues. In an even more concrete way, a Common
Position would be a useful and unambiguous tool with which to influence the US or the
timing of the decision for deployment. Specifically, the express opposition of Britain and
Denmark to the NMD system would improve the EU’s leverage over the US considerably.
Evidence suggests so far that at best, the EU might release a weak
statement incorporated into its general declarations, with the varying degrees of
opposition reducing any final statement down to the lowest common denominator. In general,
the position will remain similar to current statements such as "The EU wishes to see
the ABM Treaty preserved" or that the EU would like to see NMD deployed in such a
manner that does not "strain the transatlantic links."
However, the EU should not be content to adopt a feeble
declaration. There is clearly a need for the EU to shift away from the usual practice of
timid objections. It should respond persuasively and demonstrate its resolve. By doing so,
the EU can prove the credibility of its CFSP and advance its security interests. The
European Union should therefore agree to a decisively worded Common Position that makes
its opposition to National Missile Defense clear.
1 The comments were made during an
interview with Welt am Sonntag, which appeared on 11 June 2000
2 See the statement made by Member of Parliament Lund Olsen, cited
in Theresa Hitchens and Stuart Samuels, ‘NATO takes first look at US Missile
Defence’, Basic Paper No. 32, April 2000.
3 Testimony of Robin Cook before the House of Commons Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2000.
4 From a joint press conference with Secretary of State Albright, 8
May 2000. The text is available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/
5 See the comments by Peter Hain, Foreign Commonwealth Officer
Minister of State, Representative of the United Kingdom at the NPT Review
Conference, 11 May 2000.
6 See the comments by Hubert De La Fortelle, Representative of
France at the NPT Review Conference, 11 May 2000
7 Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article 11.
8 Ibid, Article 15.
9 Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 4 June 1999.
10Jane Perlez, "US Missile Plan Could Hurt Security Ties,
European Says." The New York Times, 2 May 2000.
This Policy Note was written by Clara
Portela-Sais and Denise Groves. They
are researchers at the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security. BITS
works on jointly with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) on
European aspects of the NMD debate.
BITS acknowledges the generous support received from the Ford Foundation
for its work on NATO-Russia relations.
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