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BITS Policy Note 00.6
July 2000
ISSN 1434-3274 |
The True Meaning of Failure
Denise Groves
This note is also available as a PDF-File
On Friday, July 7, somewhere over the Pacific Ocean, the United States
will perform a third test of its National Missile Defense technology. Officially, the
results will be used to determine the maturity of intercept technology and to decide
whether deployment of NMD can begin. But in truth, the success or failure of the test is
totally irrelevant: the decision to begin construction has already been made.
The July 7 test is certain to be dramatic and controversial. It is an experiment
ostensibly designed to test the integration of the "system of systems" that will
be coordinated to detect, track, and destroy an attacking missile from "states of
concern" such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq (all formerly known as "rogue
states"). The attack will be simulated by the launch of a 37 year-old Minuteman II
missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, equipped with one
"balloon" decoy, and aimed towards the Marshall Islands. The launch will be
detected by a satellite and the information will be relayed to the command center in
Colorado Springs. The command center will interpret the data and authorize the missile
defense crew on Kwajalein Island to launch the missile intercept, while at the same time
instructing the X-band radar on the island to track the course of the missile through
space. After the intercept missile is launched and the boost phases completed, the kill
vehicle will be released. It must then orient itself in space by employing an onboard
navigational system. The kill vehicle also uses an antenna to receive data from the X-band
radar to locate the target. The kill vehicle is autonomous at this point and must use its
sensors to discriminate between the approaching warhead and the balloon decoy. If the kill
vehicle is successful, it will identify the warhead, lock onto it, and collide with it at
a velocity of 4.6 miles per second. The sheer force of the impact is designed to
"ionize" the warhead and destroy it outside the earth's atmosphere. The entire
test, from the initial launch at Vandenberg to the intercept, will last about 30 minutes.
It will cost approximately $100 million.
There are numerous reasons why this test fails to replicate real world
conditions and will be subject to intense criticism. At least five problems immediately
come to mind:
First, the missile defense crew is fully briefed on the timing and
direction of the fake attack, the type of missile used, and the number and type of
countermeasures employed. Not a single one of these elements would be known in the event
of a real attack.
Second, the single decoy used is of a completely different shape and
size than the warhead—factors that could make it easier for the kill vehicle to
decide which mass it should target. The number of decoys the attacking missile will carry
is also limited to one, instead of the nine used in an earlier test. Most experts agree
that in the real world, attacking missiles would likely be equipped with multiple
countermeasures.
Third, the attacking missile will carry a beacon so that a radar in
Hawaii will be able to detect it and monitor the overall test. The warhead will also be
outfitted with a Global Positioning System (GPS). The Pentagon maintains that these
measures are necessary for safety reasons and that they will not be used to help the kill
vehicle during the acquisition phase of the intercept test. Still, even if the radar in
Hawaii does not help with targeting, it is intended to provide early warning data.
Fourth, the radars used in this test are not the radars that will be
employed in the final version of the NMD system; "surrogates" are being used in
the interim.
Fifth, the booster for the intercept missile is also a
"surrogate" because the real (and controversial) booster is still in
development.
The Welch Committee, a government-appointed NMD oversight group, has
expressed doubts whether the kill vehicle would be able to survive the rough flight of the
fast, three-stage booster under development. For now, the Department of Defense is using a
slower and smoother, two-phase booster as a substitute.
Despite all of the controls, complete briefings, and intense
preparations, there is a fairly good chance the July 7 test will fail. Even Undersecretary
of Defense Jacques Gansler has admitted that there is "not a high probability of
being able to precisely get everything to work on this flight." Nevertheless, the
Pentagon is already prepared to defend the integrity of the NMD program in case something
does go wrong over the Pacific. Their expected response? A miss is not really a miss. That
is, a failed intercept does not necessarily mean that Secretary of Defense William Cohen
cannot recommend that deployment of NMD should begin. Rather, it depends on what kind of
failure it is. The Pentagon hints that analysis of a failed test will show that it is
still technologically possible to go ahead with deployment. The fact that this experiment
is being conducted with a total disregard for scientific rigor becomes even more clear at
this point. The DoD has postponed this test several times to resolve unexpected problems
and has spent millions upon millions of dollars to make sure everything goes according to
plan. And yet, one wonders, what is the point of the test if the conclusion will be the
same anyway? Both a successful hit or "non-failure" failure of the technology
will still be used to perform the Deployment Readiness Review, a review that is meant to
examine the technological status or maturity of the NMD program and its costs. More
important, it will form the basis of the Secretary's recommendation to the President
whether or not to proceed with deployment.
The Review has not yet even been conducted, but the Pentagon is already arguing that
construction of the radar in Alaska must begin before next summer in order for the system
to be ready by 2005—Year One for proponents of NMD who believe that North Korea will
be poised to attack the US by then. Politicians from both parties also generally agree
that the decision to deploy must be taken soon— primarily because NMD has become a
hostage of election year politics. The same politics have rendered
meaningless the Clinton Administration's promise to consider four separate factors in the
decision to proceed toward deployment. This cannot be denied given what is already known
about the astronomical cost of the NMD system, the widely advertised negative effects it
could have on international security and arms control, and the dubious nature of the
threat from "states of concern." Despite this knowledge, the Clinton
Administration is already considering how it can begin pouring concrete in Alaska next
summer without actually violating the ABM Treaty.
In light of the fact that officials are already preparing the ground to start
construction, one can only conclude that the true failure of the July 7 test is already
known: $100 million will be wasted to conduct a rigged test whose results will have no
practical effect either way on the decision to begin deployment. That's because the
decision has already been made.
This Policy Note was written by Denise Groves. She is a
researcher at the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Secuirty.
BITS acknowledges the generous support received from the Ford Foundation
for its work on NATO-Russia relations.
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