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BITS Policy Note 99.4
ISSN 1434-7687
2. December 1999 |
European Security - Sharks and Minnows off
Helsinki
Towards the EU-Summit in Finland
By Peter Cross and Otfried Nassauer
This note is also available as a PDF-File
The European Union, an organization that has to date managed to
peacefully unite 15 nations through non-military means, is now keen to adopt military
crisis management capacities in addition to non-military alternatives. The EU’s
involvement in crisis management was first introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty in the
framework of the Petersberg Tasks. The speed at which the EU has forged ahead with its
military ambitions has been surprising for this notoriously slow organization and it does
not seem about to let up.
When the European Council meets in Helsinki next week military crisis
management capabilities will come up against non-military capabilities as the Union
determines its priorities in this field. In the one corner, the Finnish Presidency has
prepared, alongside its draft presidency progress report on CFSP, a Draft for the
Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union which places
the emphasis on the development of effective non-military crisis response tools within the
European Union. In the opposite corner, Europe’s big guns - France, Germany, Great
Britain and Italy – who, meeting in Paris on Tuesday, 30 November, have agreed on a
joint proposal to the Helsinki European Council stressing the development of a military
plan of action for European Union crisis response. Their "toolbox" paper covers
military bodies, military planning and operational command and control. It remains
classified. The bigger European nations also pushed the Finnish Presidency hard to put
substantial emphasis in its report on military crisis management
There is a very real danger that the four big guns will ride roughshod
over the non-military proposals and force through a military dominated European Union
crisis management policy – a situation that BITS has warned against from the
beginning of this debate. An autonomous European crisis management capacity that places an
equal priority on both a capable military structure and on non-military capacities would
provide a crisis management structure that would not only be a valuable alternative to
NATO, but also a valuable supplement. A European crisis management capacity focusing
mainly on military instruments would be particularly unfortunate as the EU, to date a
purely civilian organization, has been in a far stronger position to undertake
non-military crisis management than NATO – an organization whose thinking often seems
totally confined to its military toolbox. Focusing EU crisis management on military
instruments would do little more than poorly duplicate NATO.
The European Union, as indicated by the Finnish Presidency's draft
report, has already developed an impressive array of non-military crisis management and
conflict prevention tools, which with the support and guidance proposed by the Finns,
could be transformed into an effective and constructive mechanism. The Union, on the other
hand, never having been a military organization is poorly equipped in this regard, and is
going to need substantial investment before it can make a military machine of its own
operational. The big guns are determined to develop an autonomous European military
capacity that can operate independently of NATO and intervene in conflicts where NATO
(read USA) either fears to tread, or is not interested. This determination isn’t
making the Alliance’s big brother, the United States, particularly happy. Former US
national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, leveled stern criticism against the
development of an autonomous European military capacity, saying that Europe is wasting
money because a strong military capacity is already available under NATO. Following the
war in Kosovo the US has criticized the Europeans for failing to pull their weight in the
NATO military operation. NATO’s military commander during the Kosovo war, Gen. Wesley
Clark, addressed this issue saying that alliance solidarity was being challenged because
the notion of shared burden was not being met. Clark said that in Yugoslavia the United
States had carried far too heavy a burden and were leagues ahead of the other alliance
members in all fields, including intelligence. US forces sent around 800 Aircraft to fight
the Kosovo war, double the amount sent by the rest of the NATO states combined. US
aircraft were reported to have flown over 70% of the missions. The Americans believe that
Europe should concentrate on becoming more effective partners within the Alliance,
spending more for the Alliance, before concentrating on what they perceive to be the
development of structures that are in direct competition to NATO. At the core of the US
expectations the European members of NATO are required to spend on NATO controlled
capabilities, not on capabilities they control themselves. The emerging European
consensus, however, envisages these future strategic capabilities coming under the control
of the European Union, thus developing them into a bargaining chip whenever Europe has to
negotiate the strategies and tactics for future military crisis management with its
transatlantic partners. This reflects the different lessons learned from Kosovo.
The guiding principles of the EU summit in Cologne called for the
creation of an EU capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military
capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. The focus of the debate has to date
been on the development of these military capabilities. The European Union has been
preparing itself for a military role for some time now, adopting an ever closer
relationship with the Western European Union (WEU), Western Europe’s security
organization. The Amsterdam Treaty provided the EU with access to this organization’s
capacities and capabilities in order to act within the realm of the Petersberg Tasks. The
Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of integrating the WEU into the European
Union, should the European Council so decide. During the past 12 months this option has
been explored, and the Cologne summit declaration set a date of the end of 2000 to finally
take decisions. The WEU seems, however, to have jumped the gun, and following its
Luxembourg Council of Ministers in November, has now already been de facto
partially integrated into the European Union. In the declaration the WEU Ministers
declared their willingness to allow bodies of the Council of the European Union direct
access, as required, to the expertise of the organization’s operational structures,
including the WEU Secretariat, the Military Staff, the Satellite Center and the Institute
for Security Studies. The result being that the EU member states now have full and equal
access to the WEU without first having settled all the problems that were associated with
the WEU’s institutional integration into the EU – particularly a role for the
WEU’s associate members and observers.
To crown this development the European Union’s high representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, was also appointed secretary
general of the WEU. More than issuing a second hat to Mr. Solana, it brings CFSP and the
WEU together under Mr. Solana’s burgeoning hat. Mr. Solana is the first to hold this
position and is therefore free to mould it. His role contains both, facets of a foreign
minister and facets of a defense minister. By placing Solana in charge of both the WEU and
the CFSP, effectively overseeing the EU’s military and foreign policy developments,
the position is already somewhat heavily leaning in the direction of that of a defense
minister.
The Luxembourg WEU Council of Ministers also presented the results of
an Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations that
was initiated following the WEU Ministers meeting in Rome in November 1998. The results of
the audit show that Europeans, in principle, have the available force levels and
resources needed to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range of
Petersberg tasks. It identified a number of gaps and deficiencies, however, where these
European assets and capabilities should be strengthened to attain a higher level of
operational effectiveness in crisis management. The report identified the most urgent
efforts to be focused on:
The European Union’s big guns are already one step ahead in this
capacity build-up. At the first joint meeting of the EU’s foreign and defense
ministers the German defense minister, Rudolf Scharping, expressed the hope that the
process of integrating a security policy dimension into the EU be completed by 2002 or
2003. For Scharping and his colleagues in Britain, France and Italy, the quicker an EU
security policy becomes operational, the better. The UK has already suggested a
"headline goal" to reorganize the European crisis reaction forces into a corps
which, by 2003, could conduct crisis operations within 60 days and maintain them for up to
two years. This would require earmarking a minimum of 150,000 troops. The Eurocorps is
already on the road to change with the participating nations agreeing to transform it into
a European rapid reaction corps similar to NATO’s ARRC. This corps will be
restructured over four years. France and Germany already have more in store for the
Eurocorps: They have suggested the Eurocorps assume command of the KFOR troops, currently
stationed in Kosovo, already in the coming year. Again it is France and Germany who
suggested the creation of a European Air Transport Command.
Decisions on how to finance these developments have not yet been taken.
The Amsterdam Treaty does not allow the EU members to jointly procure military hardware
from EU resources. Defense procurement has to come from national defense budgets. However,
beyond coordinating national procurement plans, some defense ministers have already
obviously targeted the EU for future R&D projects and procurement programs, which can
be labeled "dual use".
In Helsinki the European Union will take more steps towards
developing a military capacity for crisis management than most observers expected. The
Finnish Presidency must be careful to push forward its proposal for developing parallel
non-military crisis management structures that are given equal importance. Sweden
may prove to be the Presidency’s strongest ally. Stockholm announced it will agree to
the establishment of a permanent Military Committee within the EU only on the condition
that a Permanent Committee on non-military crisis management be established in parallel.
However, the risk is that the big guns, with their emphasis on military proposals, will
pull the EU away from the Union’s non-military alternatives, wherein lie its greatest
possible strengths, and the very qualities that have united the Union internally.
A European Union crisis management capacity that contains a balance of
military and non-military crisis management structures will provide Europe with an
instrument that can truly live up to its potential. Non-military structures, like military
ones, can only be effective if they are taken seriously and are invested with sufficient
resources, something that has to date not happened in Europe. A situation where the
European Union finances post-conflict conflict prevention, such as the Stability Pact,
from its normal budget – while allocating additional funds to the development of
military crisis management– is sending the wrong signal.
The challenge that lies ahead for the European Council in Helsinki is
to develop an autonomous European security capacity that can operate swiftly and
effectively during crisis situations. An effective capacity needs to be well balanced,
giving the military and non-military components equal priority and resources. A European
security capacity that leans too heavily towards its military components will sacrifice
its comparative advantage contained in its non-military structures and capacities and go
into direct competition with as well as duplication of NATO, while a European crisis
management capability restrained to non-military means will remain dominated by NATO and
not allow for autonomous European action.
In addition the European Union is facing some more far reaching
alternatives. While taking on autonomous crisis management tasks European nations will
have to take a clear stand on whether they will clearly bind their crisis management
operations to mandates issued by either the United Nations Security Council or the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This would significantly
re-strengthen the role of both international organizations and signal an approach
different from both the US and NATO’s policy. NATO during the Kosovo crisis and the
Washington Summit resisted accepting a requirement of this type. However, EU statements to
the effect of acting "in accordance with the principles of the UN-Charter"
instead of "in accordance with the UN-Charter" already indicate a desire to
allow for non-mandated operations, if circumstances should require.
Finally, the decision-making process of the European nations on these
alternatives will strongly influence future relation between the EU and Russia. During the
Cologne Summit the EU agreed its first "Common Strategy" for the CFSP. It dealt
with EU-Russia relations and envisaged far ranging co-operation projects, which need to be
implemented. One visionary aim "would be to work with Russia to develop joint foreign
policy initiatives with regard to specific third countries and regions, to conflict
prevention and to crisis management especially in areas adjacent to Russia, on the Balkans
and the Middle East." Within the document the EU also promises to consider
"facilitating the participation of Russia, when the EU avails itself of the WEU for
missions within the range of the Petersberg tasks." It is hard to imagine that these
far reaching initiatives will lead to success unless the EU’s crisis management
approach is clearly different from NATO’s.
1. These include
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peacemaking.
2. Berlin, Paris, London und Rom einig über EU-Militärstrukturen, AFP, 30
November 1999.
3. Schlagabtausch zwischen Frankreich und USA zu Verteidigung in Europa,
DPA, 04.11.1999.
4. Walker, David Standing on our own feet http://www.guardianunlimted.co.uk 14 May,
1999.
5. Sands, David R. Talbot scolds European on their role in NATO The
Washington Times, 8 October, 1999.
6. Article 17 (ex Article J7) of the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union.
7. WEU Ministerial Council Luxembourg Declaration, Luxembourg, 23
November 1999 http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/99-luxembourg.htm
8. http://www.weu.int/eng/mini/99luxembourg/recommendations.htm
9. EU will sich in drei Jahren zum Krisenmanager mausern, AP news
wire, 15.11.1999
10. Berlin, Paris, London und Rom einig über EU-Militärstrukturen, AFP,
30.1.1999.
11. European Council, Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, Cologne,
¾.6.1999, p.26
12. op. cit., p. 21
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