A Very Strange 'Big Deal': the Sale of German Submarines to Israel

by Otfried Nassauer and Christopher Steinmetz
(Translated by Agatha Haun, Tlaxcala)

New Submarine Transaction with Israel!

Germany will supply two more Dolphin submarines to Israel, this time with the new kind of fuel-cell drive, independent of the outside air. This was reported on the weekend by "Der Spiegel" and "Focus". The contract for the additional vessels is to be signed on Monday, thus a day before the election of a new chancellor at the Permanent Secretary level (Federal Defence Ministry and Foreign Office). It has been approved by the Federal Security Council [Bundessicherheitsrat]. Foreign Minister Fischer has also agreed to the delivery, it is said. The transaction was agreed on with the future Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and her designated Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung.

At the price of a billion euros, the two additional submarines are calculated to be more than twice as expensive as those that Israel received in 1999 and 2000. A third, costing up to 330 million euros, is not supposed to be paid from the individual plan 14 of the German Defence Ministry, but from the individual plan 60 of the Finance Ministry. The transaction will permit the Defence Ministry to postpone the planned second lot of the U-212 submarine for the German navy, because the shipyard HDW-Kiel will now be working to full capacity for a longer time. Israel wants to contribute to the remaining two thirds -- to a great extent by deliveries to the Bundeswehr [German military]. In this way Jerusalem's [the authors meant Tel Aviv] main problem will be avoided, the availability of freely convertible currency. [reference 1]

For about three years Israel has been making intensive efforts to acquire additional Dolphin-type submarines. For a long time, though, this effort failed because of the financing issue. Originally Germany was not prepared to make funds available again from the defence budget (see below).

From Jerusalem's (the authors meant Tel Aviv) viewpoint it would be advantageous to be able to build up a second submarine flotilla in or on the Red Sea, for operations in the Arabian Sea and in the Indian Ocean. Regular patrols in these areas of the sea would open up for Israel new military options against those states that Israel deems especially threatening: the nuclear power Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and above all Iran, which in Israel's opinion is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Numerous indicators (see below) point to the fact that Israel wants to use, or is already using, the Dolphin-class submarines as carriers for long-range missiles and as the sea-based part of the Israeli nuclear deterrent.

From the German point of view, three aspects above all make the new submarine deal politically explosive and dubious:

• Just the appearance that Germany contributes to the modernization or maintenance of Israel's nuclear potential damages the credibility of the German policy of nuclear non-proliferation. Germany's political support of a zone free of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the Near and Middle East can hardly be credible if the impression is created that this is held to be an option only for the distant future.
• Germany's role as an intermediary in the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme clearly loses credibility. How can Berlin be a "neutral" intermediary when at the same time it helps Israel to modernize its nuclear potential?
• The floodgates are opened by the transaction in the German armaments export policy. In order to deliver the submarines, an authorization is also needed for the export of many high-tech and armaments components. This sets precedents that can and will be cited in the future by companies that want to export similar technologies and components.

In addition to this, there is possibly a fourth aspect that at present cannot be weighed with sufficient certainty. At 500 million euros, each of the two new submarines is more than twice as expensive as the three first vessels. Inflation and a new drive probably are not enough by themselves to explain the additional costs. The Bundeswehr class U-212A submarines are not nearly as expensive. The amount for the Israeli vessels could thus contain further "transactions". It is also conspicuous that the German contribution, at 330 million euros, comes suspiciously close to that 430 million euros with which Germany made a present of the first two Dolphins for Israel.

Does this submarine deal constitute now the temporary end of the project? Probably not. Possibly Israel will then desire a sixth vessel too and want to adapt the Dolphin submarines that it already has to the technical level of the new ones to be delivered.

New submarine transaction with Israel?

Israel has spoken with Defence Minister Struck in favour of a new submarine deal: "The Israeli government wants to buy two new submarines and to modernize the three that are already being used. Naturally we're ready to help and to support Israel in the acquisition", said Struck to the "Handelsblatt" on 9 September 2004. The minister also did not, in principle, rule out new financial aid. True, it is "impossible ... out of the defence budget", but they want to "consider with the trade minister which instruments can make the transaction possible". It is unclear whether it can be inferred from Struck's statement that -- as some foreign media say -- the Federal Security Council has already made a corresponding decision. Israel financed the three Dolphin submarines that it already has mainly from German tax funds, the individual plan 60 "general financial administration" of the federal budget.

Israel's request for two more submarines from Germany is not new: it was first mentioned during the Iraq crisis in late 2002 and early 2003. In addition to a Mediterranean fleet, Israel would like to set up a submarine base on the Red Sea, in order to gain more flexible possibilities for dealing with Iran, for example, from the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Israel fears that Iran is on the way to becoming a nuclear power. Additional submarines -- now with the drive that is independent of the outside air, which HDW first installed in the German submarine of the 212 A class -- are also attractive because of the substantial increase in range that is related to it. The vessels on hand could be refitted with this drive and at the same time contain some of the new technologies that were integrated into the German submarines of the first lot of the class 212 or are supposed to be integrated into the second lot.

Probably the German government's interest in the transaction is primarily in the area of industrial policy. In this same year, a north German shipyard combine is supposed to be formed from the submarine builder HDW and the shipyards of the Thyssen concern, in order to make the German shipyards more competitive, particularly against the French industry, for a future integration of the European shipyards. Along with a priority construction of frigates of the 125 class, the submarine deal with Israel would make joining the combine more attractive for the shipyards and in addition, strengthen their position in Europe. For HDW it would also be attractive that the shipyard, which in the future would live only from submarine construction and rightly fears that this will scarcely be possible, could again look forward to a prolonged phase of certain work at full capacity. In tht case, they could expect that the work force would not be so opposed to the planned merger.

Astonishingly, conjectures that Israel refits the submarines delivered from Germany on the spot, so that they serve as nuclear weapons carriers, is for Defence Minister Struck no reason at all for any kind of alarm. Israel wants to use the vessels for "protecting the coast" in shallow waters and furthermore, "already earlier there were authorizations for the sale of submarines to Israel", said Struck to the "Handelsblatt". Feigned naivete? Israel, in contrast, makes no secret of the fact that it wants a submarine-supported, and thus very secure, deterrent potential. If Israel, that acts as an undeclared nuclear power outside of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, uses the submarines as nuclear weapons carriers, then the result would be serious credibility problems for the German non-proliferation policy.

The Dolphin submarines and their armament

The "Dolphin" reached Haifa on 27 July 1999. Built in Germany, the submarine is the first of three ships that were delivered by October 2000. When the submarine arrived, a small flotilla of speedboats came out to greet it and fighter planes of the Israeli air force flew in formation over the scene. The other vessels are called "Leviathan" and "Tekuma" and reached Israel in November 1999 and October 2000, respectively. [ 1 ] After their arrival in Israel, all three submarines were refitted before they were put into service. They opened a new chapter in the history of the Israeli navy. Israel now has at its disposal some extremely capable, most modern conventional submarines. For years, the rumours have been increasing that in Israel they are refitted as carrier platforms for nuclear weapons.

Israel's new submarines were designed as type 800 by the Ingenieurs-Kontor Luebeck (IKL) and built by the shipyards HDW and TNSW. The vessels, almost 60 metres long, with a displacement of around 1,900 tonnes when they submerge, are more than twice the size of the GAL submarines that Israel used earlier. They have a range of about 4,500 nautical miles and with that can cover the entire Mediterranean Sea as their area of operations or operate from the Red Sea to far into the Indian Ocean. They were developed especially for use in relatively shallow waters near to shorelines, but have the technology that enables them to dive to a depth of more than 300 metres. The vessels have conventional drives; Israel does without the installation of the drive that is independent of the outside air, which was still in the development stage at that time, and which HDW at present installs in German type 212 A submarines, although this clearly increases the capabilities for staying submerged for long periods. The Dolphin submarines are regarded as extraordinarily quiet and thus extremely difficult to locate.

The submarines are equipped with a modern computerized guidance and combat system made by STN-Atlas-Elektronik and a multitude of modern German and Israeli sensor systems.

The Israeli navy wants to use these submarines for many purposes. The priority area of operations is the Mediterranean Sea, where Israel's only submarine base is located at present. [ 2 ] Here, in case of tension or war, the vessels serve, among other purposes, to secure the supply routes at sea, combat enemy naval forces, disrupt enemy maritime supply routes, carry out land operations with special forces who are landed and later picked up by the submarines, conceal the mining of areas of the sea and harbours, and fight against land-based targets from out at sea. Even in peace time, but of course also in wartime, the submarines are naturally suitable for reconnaissance and for gathering data and information, one of their most important tasks. Only in a few cases do Israel's submarines operate outside the Mediterranean. [ 3 ]

Even so, the Dolphin submarines display an unusual feature that is conspicuous for the Western submarine world. They possess ten torpedo tubes and a front section, with which weapons of two different calibres can be fired. Six torpedo tubes are of 533 mm calibre that is customary in the Western world.

• Heavy torpedos of the German Seehecht type (DM2A3) can be shot from tubes of this calibre,
• Sub-Harpoon type missiles (or theoretically even sea-based Tomahawk-type cruise missiles) can be launched against targets at sea and on land,
• sea mines can be laid, and
• combat divers or special forces can be placed in position or picked up again.

A total of 16 rockets and / or torpedos (as well as underwater mines) can be taken along. [ 4 ]

Beyond that, the Dolphin submarines have four torpedo tubes of the unusual 650 mm calibre, [ 5 ] which in the past was used only by the Soviet Union, to fire extra-heavy torpedos and above all, conventional and nuclear cruise missiles. There are many observations related to this special feature, which also bestows on the HDW shipyard a technology unique in the Western world, questioning the sense and purpose of the four other tubes.

Nuclear weapons carrier or not?

The "Los Angeles Times" reported on 12.10.2003 that Israel has now succeeded in equipping the Dolphin submarines with nuclear-armed Sub-Harpoon missiles, for which an atomic warhead, a guidance mechanism for ship-to-land operations, and further components were developed by the Israeli armaments industry in the last few years. Israel now possesses a sea-based deterrent capability which thereby is hardly vulnerable. This was confirmed by two unnamed sources from US administration circles and independently of them, by an Israeli source. The informants' intention was to protect Israel by making the information public.

Early on, there were already rumours that Israel wanted to refit the German-built submarines as nuclear weapons carriers. At first they emerged as unproven claims, later they became concrete. In 2000 both the "Washington Post" and the "Sunday Times" reported that Israel intended to station nuclear Sub-Harpoon rockets on board the vessels. [ 6 ]

Yet while there can hardly be any doubt that Israel is building up a sea-based nuclear deterrent, caution is called for when reports are involved that these consist of nuclear-armed Sub-Harpoon rockets. These rockets in their conventional version carry a 227 kg warhead over a distance of about 130 kilometres. Most nuclear warheads are heavier than conventional kinds. Even if Israel is supposed to have succeeded in developing a very lightweight atomic warhead for this missile [ 7 ] and even if it supposedly succeeded in increasing its range significantly, this would still be a highly unsatisfactory interim solution, in view of Israel's strategic interests. In addition, it would have cost a large amount of money because the development of a new atomic warhead is expensive, just like the refitting of the missile.

For clarification: even with a Harpoon rocket, which with a range of 250 km flies about twice as far as its conventional counterpart, Israel could cover only a few of the targets that are important for its nuclear deterrent, for these are often not near the coast, but rather far in the interior of other states. Furthermore: even targets near the coast in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, or even in Pakistan could only be attacked with a rocket with this range if the submarine first were transferred out of the Mediterranean, through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, or the Dardanelles, close enough to the coasts of the target country. From its normal area of operations in the Mediterranean Sea, only relatively few interesting targets could be reached with missiles of this kind. In addition to that, an attack on these would at the same time be encumbered with the risk that the nuclear fallout would not stop at the Israeli borders.

Similar arguments also speak against a further missile variant, that was mentioned in reports on the Dolphin submarines' armament: the equipping of the submarines with so-called "Turbo-Popeye" rockets with a range of 200-350 km. [ 8 ]

Israel's strategic interests in a sea-based nuclear deterrent capability bring in the claim that it is necessary for the missiles to have much greater capabilities, a greater range. These would have to be at least around 1,000 kilometres or even 1,500 and more, if Israel wanted to threaten the most important targets of its potential enemies in countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, or even Pakistan.

This was made clear already by Israel's first attempt to acquire suitable nuclear-capable carrier systems. Israel inquired in the USA whether Washington was prepared to deliver 50 Tomahawk-type cruise missiles. Their nuclear variant had a range of 2,500 kilometres. The USA, though, was not prepared for such a delivery. [ 9 ]

Since then there have repeatedly been reports that Israel is developing its own missiles with a greater range. There is scarcely any reliable information about the existence and progress of such a programme: tests of missiles with a greater range (1,500 km) were supposedly conducted off the coast of Sri Lanka in May 2000. [ 10 ] When questioned about that, Eli Marum, chief of Israeli naval operations, answered: "You know who our neighbours are. Do you think that we should test long-range rockets?" [ 11 ]

Longer-range missiles could also explain the actual purpose of the four additional torpedo tubes with a diameter of 650 mm. [ 12 ] The larger the diameter of a missile, the more fuel can be accommodated in a missile of a limited length. Israel could develop, or could have developed, the nuclear-capable missiles to be fired from these tubes, independently for the most part, as well as with the discreet assistance of other states. Their installation could be part of the refitting that Israel undertakes with all Dolphin submarines delivered from Germany.

From the Israeli point of view, a sea-based nuclear deterrent represents a strategic element that is also directed against more distant potential enemies. Already on 1 December 1990, the former commander of the Israeli navy, Major General Avraham Botzer, said on the television broadcast "A New Evening" (channel 1): "These submarines must be a resource of the state of Israel. (...) Everywhere in the world submarines serve as part of the deterrent system against unconventional warfare. (...) They are a means of guaranteeing that the enemy doesn't feel tempted to make a preemptive attack with nonconventional weapons, thinking he can still come out of it with impunity". [ 13 ]

Prevention

One day before the report of the "Los Angeles Times", on 11.10.03, "Der Spiegel" first announced that Israel's government had given Mossad the task of developing operational plans to completely destroy the Iranian nuclear installations with a military preventive strike. [ 14 ] In Israeli security circles, such an operation is considered feasible. Is there a connection between these reports? Yes and No.

In the past Israel was the only country in the world that had carried out such a military preventive strike outside a war. In June 1981, Israeli fighter planes destroyed the Iraqi Ozirak reactor. Only with the help of the USA was it possible to prevent the United Nations Security Council from sharply condemning Israel for its action in violation of international law -- Washington exercised its veto right. Some sources report that at around the same time, Israel thought about preventive destruction of the Pakistani nuclear installations, [ 15 ] but that India did not grant the necessary landing and overflight rights.

The political constellation in Washington of that time, under Ronald Reagan, resembled that of today regarding policy toward Israel. The Sharon administration can be quite sure that Washington would once again hinder a condemnation of Israel in the Security Council, particularly since Washington itself in the meantime no longer rules out preventive attacks of this kind, but rather openly identifies them as part of the national security strategy. This knowledge could, though, strengthen those in the Sharon administration who are prepared not only to plan but also to carry out such an attack. Israel has repeatedly made it clear that it is not prepared to tolerate the nuclear programmes of its Arab neighbours (Begin doctrine).

The current reactions from Iran are correspondingly clear, warning Israel against doing "something stupid", and announcing determined resistance -- for example, attacks on the Israeli Dimona nuclear installation. In view of this tense situation, the American government employees' indiscretions in the "Los Angeles Times" could in fact have the aim of hastily warning both sides against acting carelessly.

In contrast, considerations and questions as to whether Israel could possibly use nuclear weapons to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities belong in the realm of speculation about what is highly improbable. Even at the time of the conventional attack on the Ozirak reactor, Ariel Sharon, today Israel's prime minister, said: "That was perhaps the most difficult decision ever faced by an Israeli government in all the years of our state's existence." A nuclear attack on Iranian nuclear sites would be incomparably more problematic and serious. In view of Israel's conventional capabilities and the tradition of not admitting that it possesses nuclear weapons, such an action appears practically unimaginable. [ 16 ]

An endless story?

In the context of the renewed Gulf crisis in late 2002 / early 2003 Israel expressed to Germany the wish to have two more Dolphin submarines and with that made it clear that the original plan to procure five submarines had not been abandoned. [ 17 ] The German government will therefore again have to deal with an extremely sensitive export project and its authorization, in view of its knowledge that Israel wants to use the submarines delivered by Germany as nuclear weapons carriers.

A look back: the history of the Dolphin submarines begins in the first half of the 1980s, when Israel was thinking about a successor for its three GAL-class submarines, built according to German plans and built with German assistance in Great Britain. At that time, the Israeli navy demanded a fleet of five submarines with a displacement of about 1,500 tonnes, a range that could cover the entire Mediterranean Sea, a very small crew, and multifaceted capabilities for use. Because of its positive experiences with the GAL vessels designed in Germany, Israel turned to their design bureau, the Ingenieurskontor-Luebeck, IKL, and the shipyard Howaldts-Deutsche Werft AG. Beginning in 1986 a new submarine class was developed for Israel and paid for by Israel. The project became publicly known by chance when an investigative committee of the German parliament [Bundestag] was examining potentially illegal submarine deliveries to the South African apartheid regime, which was under embargo. Yet the financing of the construction of new submarines proved to be difficult. In mid-1988 plans were begun to use money from the US military aid for this purpose, and to assemble submarines at the US shipyard Ingalls from sections produced earlier in Germany. In 1989 Washington was prepared to make up to $600 million available, but Israel could not furnish its share of the financing, so that in November 1990 the project that had already been agreed on contractually was stopped for the time being. [ 18 ] The development work, however, was continued in Germany and in Israel. The design of the submarines was once again changed in one decisive detail, probably in the early 1990s. The front section of the submarine with the torpedo tubes was reconstructed in order to provide for additional tubes of 650 mm calibre in addition to the 533 mm calibre torpedo tubes that were always envisioned. [ 19 ]

Yet already in early 1991 a new option opened up for carrying out the plan. The German government began to consider possibilities for giving military support to Israel, under the pressure of a research campaign, triggered by publications of the Simon Wiesenthal Institute, concerning the German deliveries to Saddam Hussein's programme of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. On 30 January 1991 the German government reached an agreement with Israel on the delivery of armaments products worth 1.2 billion deutschmarks. [ 20 ] Two new submarines, among other items, were supposed to be financed from that. [ 21 ] In June 1991 the relevant agreement was signed. A year later, negotiations over a third vessel began. These came to a conclusion only in 1994, after the German government again promised to share in paying the costs. On 9 February 1995 a supplementary agreement on that was signed. In February 1992 the preparatory work for the construction began. The building of the first submarine at HDW began in 1994. The construction of the second vessel began in 1995, the third in 1996. The vessels were delivered to Israel in July 1999 ("Dolphin"), November 1999 ("Leviathan"), and October 2000 ("Tekuma").

Israel received the three submarines from Germany for the most part as a present. The German government officially assumed the total cost of the construction of the first two submarines, with 880 million DM, and half of the cost of the third submarine, with 220 million DM. Israel was supposed to bear the other half of the costs, probably in the form of deliveries for the Bundeswehr, above all for the new class 212 A submarines. [ 22 ] The German government puts the value of the three submarines at 1.28 billion DM, 1.2 billion of which was provided by the German taxpayer. The Israeli contribution was equivalent to 180 million DM at the maximum. In the international specialist publications, the costs per submarines were given at around $300-400 million; the difference in the amounts could in part be explained by the expenses for the refitting of the submarines in Israel, or the costs of the armaments. The costs of the submarines armaments are not included in the German data.

It is not known at present whether the German government will comply with Israel's request for two more submarines. Nor is it known whether the Federal Security Council has already agreed to what Israel wants. The background conditions are still significant now, in contrast to 1991. HDW is fully occupied with orders for years to come, and has just successfully bid for the delivery of two new submarines to Portugal. Indeed, in the future the shipyard must probably live from the construction of submarines alone if -- as planned -- it comes to a north German shipyard c combine. On the other hand, through an authorization for this transaction this could seem attractive for industrial policy, making this period of full work loads last longer, and thus reducing the resistance of the personnel. However, at the present, the budget situation in Germany hardly allows for giving billions to Israel. [ 23 ] In comparison, Israel could speculate that an intensification of the confrontation with Iran -- similar to that with Iraq in 1990/91 -- can be used in order to compel Germany again to aid in financing, on the grounds of earlier German weapons delivers to Iran. On the basis of the publications that say that Israel uses, or wants to use, these submarines as nuclear weapons carriers, a positive decision would be considerably more difficult for the German government in political terms than in 1991. It can no longer argue that it knows nothing for certain. The foreign policy side effects, with regard to the Arab and Islamic world, and the effect of the signal it would send to arms control policy, would be devastating for the credibility of the German non-proliferation policy. In view of the previous history of the promise of 1990/91, it must be doubted that on the other hand the diplomatic defence line of Defence Minister Struck -- that they are prepared to deliver when Israel pays and at the same to harbour the hope that Israel does not have the money -- turns out to be sustainable in the future.

Proliferation risks

A technology transfer is involved with each armaments deal, which is determined by the kind and character of the transaction. Since Israel financed the design and the development of the Dolphin submarines in the 1980s, parts of the rights to the Dolphin-type submarine belong to Israel, probably 50 percent. [ 24 ] Israel can offer the use of these rights and the Israeli-built components not only to Germany, but also to other states. In addition, Israel could try to make capital from the ownership of the design and production documents, which are available in Israel in their entirety, or to earn hard currency from that.

Taiwan can serve as an example of such a transaction option, such a proliferation risk. Under George W. Bush, the USA promised Taiwan that it would make it possible for the Taiwanese navy to acquire eight diesel submarines. Since the US shipbuilding industry itself does not have the know-how to build modern conventional submarines, that must be obtained elsewhere. Taiwan gives priority to having German submarine types, but the German government won't supply them to Taiwan because of its one-China policy and out of consideration for the People's Republic. Israel has repeatedly offered itself as an alternative. It cannot be ruled out that in this way, German armaments products and technologies will ultimately find their way to Taiwan. [ 25 ] According to information in the Israeli newspaper "Ha'aretz", the American shipyard of Northrop Grumman, that was entrusted with examining the delivery options for Taiwan, is also supposed to be examining an option, among others, for the construction of the submarines in the USA with the aid of the Dolphin technology and offering them to Taiwan. Connected to this option is Israel's hope of possibly ordering two or three additional Dolphin submarines and being able to pay with American military aid. As a rule, Foreign Military Sales funds are tied to the condition of purchasing the armaments products in the USA. [ 26 ]

Appendix: German submarine exports

* Packages are submarines whose sections are produced in Germany and assembled at local shipyards.

is a free-lance journalist and director of the Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security / Berliner Informationszentrum fuer Transatlantische Sicherheit (BITS),
   is a research associate at BITS.

Endnotes:

[1]  Zur Bewertung der rüstungsexportpolitischen Seite des Dolphin-U-Bootes vgl.: Otfried Nassauer & Christopher Steinmetz: Die deutsch-israelische Rüstungskooperation, BITS Research Report 03.1, Berlin, September 2003 sowie: "Deutschland lieferte die Plattform", Interview mit Otfried Nassauer, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.10.2003

[2] Überlegungen, fünf neue U-Boote auf die drei U-Boote der GAL-Klasse folgen zu lassen und einen zweiten U-Boot-Stützpunkt am Roten Meer auszubauen, wurden - wohl aus Kostengründen - bisher nicht realisiert. Es ist davon auszugehen, daß sie weiterhin existieren. Israel äußerte während der jüngsten Golfkrise 2002/03 den Wunsch nach zwei weiteren U-Booten. Aus israelischer Sicht muß ein zweiter U-Boot-Stützpunkt am Roten Meer strategisch und operativ ausgesprochen attraktiv erscheinen, weil sich von einem solchen Stützpunkt aus militärische Operationen im Arabischen Meer, am Golf oder sogar im Indischen Ozean durchführen lassen würden, die heute kaum möglich wären, weil eine Verlegung israelischer U-Boote durch den Suez-Kanal oder die Straße von Gibraltar erforderlich wäre. Jedoch setzt eine solche Erweiterung der operativen Möglichkeiten auch eine Mindestgröße der U-Bootflotte von fünf Schiffen voraus.

[3] Berichte, daß Israel immer ein U-Boot im Mittelmeer, eines im Roten Meer und eines in Reserve hält, würden voraussetzen, daß die Boote auch im Frieden regelmäßig den Suez-Kanal passieren. Davon ist zumindest den Autoren nichts bekannt geworden. Zudem tauchten die ersten Berichte über dieses Operationsschema bereits auf, als Israel noch nicht über alle drei U-Boote in Dienst gestellt hatte. Seither wird die Meldung immer wieder wiederholt.

[4] Zur Bewaffnung vgl. Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000, S.343; Naval Forces, Juni 1998, S. 62-79; www.naval-technology.com/projects/dolphin/index.html; Jane's International Defense Review, September 1999, S.8

[5]Die Bundesregierung hat in Antwort auf Anfragen der Abg. Angelika Beer im September 1999 die Existenz dieser zusätzlichen Torpedorohre bestätigt, jedoch mitgeteilt, ihr seinen die "Gründe nicht bekannt", warum diese Rohre eingebaut wurden. Sie habe "an den Bauspezifikationen nicht mitgewirkt". Bei Auslieferung der U-Boote seien die 650mm Torpedorohre durch Metallschienen auf das Kaliber 533mm verengt und somit nur zum Verschuß von normalen Torpedos und Sub-Harpoon-Flugkörpern nutzbar.

[6] Erstmals taucht diese Variante auf in: First Dolphins Move in on Israeli Navy, Jane's International Defense Review, 24.8.1999

[7] Es gibt Berichte, daß Israel einen nur 200kg schweren Nuklearsprengkopf mit 6kg Plutonium entwickelt habe.

[8] Vgl. z.B. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/popeye-t.htm; der Abschluß der Entwicklung dieser Flugkörper ist nicht bestätigt; die Existenz wurde zuerst in einem Bericht des US National Air Intelligence Centers an den Congress 1998 erwähnt. Auch im Juni 2004 scheint der Popeye-Flugkörper weiterhin ein Entwicklungsvorhaben zu sein, ebenso wie eine reichweitengesteigerte Version der Schiff-Schiff-Rakete Gabriel 3. Allerdings wird im gleichen Zusammenhang berichtet, dass Israel durch Hinzufügen einer Startrakete aus dem Luft-Boden-Flugkörper Delilah einem land- und seegestützten Flugkörper (Delilah-GL und Delilah-SL) mit einer Reichweite von 250 oder gar mehr als 300 km abgeleitet habe. Vgl. Alon Ben David: Israel Develops ground-launched Delilah missile, Jane's Defence Weekly, 16.6.2004, S.10. Aufgrund des geringen Gefechtskopfgewichtes (nach Herstellerangaben 54kg in der Luft-Boden-Varinate) kommt der Flugkörper allerdings als nukleare Waffe kaum infrage. Auch über eine israelisch-indische Kooperation bei seegestützten Flugkörpern ("They [the Indians] now appear interested in enhancing the long-range capabilities of the Navy.") ist öffentlich zuwenig bekannt, um bereits Schlüsse zu ziehen. Vgl. India and Israel mull missile technology cooperation, in JDW 8.9.2004, S.7.

[9] Vgl u.a. Israel Moves Quickly To Beef up its Submarine Force, Global Intelligence Update, 26.10.00

[10] Defence Systems Daily, 26.10.2000, http://defence-data.com/archive/page8879.htm ; Sunday Times 18.6.00, Washington Post, 15.6.2002; entsprechende Vermutungen wurden bereits im September 1999 geäußert, siehe Jane's International Defense Review, Nr.9, 1999, S.

[11] Jerusalem Report, September 2002, S. 24

[12] Diese Erklärung ist jedenfalls schlüssiger als jene, die israelische Quellen gelegentlich verbreiten: Die Rohre seien für Swimmer Delivery Vehicles zum Aussetzen von Spezialkräften gedacht und die Verengungsschienen, mit denen die Rohre auf 533mm verkleinert werden können, seien erforderlich, damit aus den Rohren auch Torpedos verschossen werden könnten. Da diese Schienen kaum während eines Einsatzes, auf See, ein- und ausgebaut werden dürften, macht diese Erklärung wenig Sinn. Zudem gibt es Hinweise darauf, daß das U-Boot für das Aussetzen von Kampfschwimmern mit einem besonderen Wet and Dry Compartment ausgestattet worden sein soll.

[13] zitiert nach Ha'aretz 9.6.1998

[14] Yossi Melman. Swmming with the Dolphins, Ha'aretz 9.6.98 diskutierte diese Option bereits vor 6 Jahren unter Berufung auf den ehemaligen israelischen Luftwaffenchef GenMaj. Herzl Bodinger; Israel bemüht sich seit vielen Jahren, die Politik des Westens und insbesondere Washingtons gegen das iranische Nuklearprogramm in Stellung zu bringen. Es darf dabei auf die Unterstützung vieler neokonservativer in und aßerhalb der Bushadministration zählen, so u.a. auf John Bolton, Douglas Feith, Michael Ledeen, Norman Podheretz,. Richard Perle oder Paul Wolfowitz. Vgl: Ed Blanche: Israel steps up claims on Iran's nuclear arms, JDW 22.4.1998 oder jüngst ausführlich und alarmistisch wiedergegeben in: Erich Follath, Georg Mascolo: Der Tanz um die Bombe, Spiegel 38/2004, S.112ff.

[15] . zit. nach Schneider, Barry M.: Radical Responses to Radical Regimes - Evaluating Pre-emptive Counterproliferation, McNair Paper 41, National Defense University, Washington, May 1995, S.14-15

[16] Scharonzitat: ebd S.13; für den weiterführenden Gedanken vgl.: Luis Rene Beres: Israel's Strategic Future, Project Daniel, Final Report, 16.1.2003. Der Bericht wurde dem Israelischen Premierminister Ariel Scharon am gleichen Tag persönlich übergeben. Er reklamiert Israels Recht auf konventionelle Präemption einschließlich der Enthauptung der gegnerischen Führung, fordert eine gesicherte land- oder seegestützte Zweitschlagsfähigkeit gegen bis zu 15 geographisch weit auseinanderliegende städtische Ziele im Lande dessen, der sich eine biologische oder nukleare Fähigkeit zulegen könnte, warnt aber in deutlichen Worten vor dem Glauben, daß nukleare Präemption oder taktisch-nukleare, low-yield Kriegführungsfähigkeiten Israel politische oder militärisch-operative Vorteile bringen könnten. Eine U-Bootgestützte Nuklearfähigkeit für Israel hält der Project Daniel Bericht derzeit noch nicht für erforderlich, verweist aber darauf, dass sich wandelnde Umstände eine solche Fähigkeit bald erforderlich machen könnten.

[17] Amos Harel: Navy eyes 2 new Dolphin submarines, Ha'aretz 19.2.03.

[18] Jane's Fighting Ships 1994-95, London, 1994, S.323

[19] Während des U-Boot-Untersuchungsausschusses war zwar bekannt beworden, daß Israel von IKL ein U-Boot-Design entwickeln ließ; damals aber ergaben sich keinerlei öffentlich gewordene Hinweise auf die Einplanung von Torpedorohren des Kalibers 650 mm. Zur Zeit läßt sich nicht endgültig klären, ob diese Rohre bereits in den 80er Jahren Bestandteil der Planung waren, weil bereits 1979 eine Überprüfung der Option, nukleare Harpoon Raketen zu integrieren, angestellt und letztlich wegen mangelnder Erfolgsaussichten aufgegeben wurde, oder ob die Idee, diese Rohre zu integrieren erst nach dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR entstand. Letzteres ist wahrscheinlicher.

[20] Der engen zeitlichen Abfolge dieser Ereignisse könnte ein ebenso großer inhaltliche Zusammenhang entsprochen haben. Daß Deutschland wg. der Veröffentlichungen unter politischen Handlungs- und Kompensationsdruck geraten werde, war bereits absehbar, als Israel den trilateralen Vertrag mit den USA und Deutschland stoppte. Der 2. Golfkrieg begann am 15.1.1991; während des Krieges schoß der Irak Scud-Raketen auf Israel ab.

[21] In Israel erhielten die Boote deswegen die Spitznamen "Saddam" und "Hussein"

[22] Solche Zulieferungen sind attraktiv, weil sie Israel von der Notwendigkeit entlasten, große Summen in konvertierbaren Währungen aufzubringen.

[23] Vgl. Barbara Opall-Rome: Berlin Nixes Israeli Request for free Subs, Defense News, 14.6.2004, S.18 und das eingangs erwähnte Interview Strucks mit dem Handelsblatt. Israel verfügt auch heute nicht über die Mittel, weitere U-Boote selbst zu bezahlen. Es kann sie sich nur leisten, wenn es in Deutschland oder den USA einen Finanzier findet. Deutschland kommt dafür zur Zeit nicht in Betracht, da ein mit 1990/91 vergleichbarer politischer Druck - aufgebaut über die deutsche Mitverantwortung für die Bedrohung Israels mit Massenvernichtungswaffen - in der jüngsten Irak-Krise nicht entstand. Ob bei einer weiteren Verschärfung der Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Iran erneut ein solcher Druck aufgebaut werden könnte, muß hier dahingestellt bleiben - aber selbst wenn dies geschähe, so wäre der Zusammenhang mit der Frage der Lieferung weiterer U-Boote aufgrund der Vorgeschichte recht offensichtlich.

[24] Zur Planungs- und Entstehungsgeschichte siehe u.a. Naval Forces, Nr. 6, S. 66-70 und Wehrtechnik, Nr.1, 1991, S.64f;  Zu der Frage der Rechte siehe Ha'aretz, 29.7.2002, Taipeh Times 18.9.2002, Wehrtechnik, Nr.7, 1991, S.21.

[25] Zu den Möglichkeiten israelischer U-Boot Exporte siehe Ha'aretz, 29.7.2002 (English Edition), www.haaretzdaily.com ; antimilitarismus information, Nr. 7-8, 2002, S. 22ff.; Asian Defence Journal, Nr. 9, 2002, S.36ff. Auch der Vize-Vorstandsvorsitzende von HDW, Hannfried Haun, deutete diese Kooperationsoption bereits in einem Interview an: "Taiwan kann auswählen zwischen den modifizierten Klassen 212, 214 und Dolphin - einem in Deutschland entworfenen U-Boot, ausgestattet mit israelischer Bewaffnung." Taipeh Times, 18.9.2002.

[26] vgl. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Daily Alert, 29.7.02. In diese Richtung geht auch: John J. Tkacik Jr.: United Front on Taiwan - Concerted Western Action Could Supply Subs, Heritage Foundation 16.9.2002
Zudem hoffen manche, daß die Tatsache, daß HDW nunmehr im Besitz der US-amerikanischen Investmentgesellschaft OEP ist, eine Nutzung von deutschen Technologien erleichtert.